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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPHINE o. GARRAND, for 
herself and as Guardian Ad Litem 
for JOSEPH PHILLIP GARRAND, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, / 
vs. Case No. 16622 
LEONARD J. GARRAND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought for support of an incapacitated 
child, now over the age of twenty-one (21) years, pursuant to 
Sections 78-45-3 and 4, u.c.A. (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court held that the plaintiff had pursue4 
appropriate procedure and required defendant to pay $150 p8Z' 
month for the support of the child and awarded $300 
fees and costs (R. 51). 
The defendant had moved 
ground that the divorce decree in civil action No. 
Third District Court was ~ judicata 
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motion prayed alternatively for consolidation of the divorce 
action with this action. The Motion to Dismiss was denied and 
the Court ordered consolidation of action No. 186725 into this 
action No. 78-6783, and that all subsequent pleadings and pro-
ceedings be under No. 78-6783 (R. 16 and 17). 
Paragraph 4 of defendant's Answer (R. 18) sought to 
raise again the issue of !!!. judicata. The Motion to Strike 
made by the plaintiff (R. 21) was granted (R. 32). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The testimony at the trial has not been transcribed. 
Appellant's Statement of Facts must, therefore, be limited to 
the pleadings and other court records and there are no record 
references to any of the statements in appellant's Statement of 
Facts. Likewise, as to the material on pages 5 and 6, these 
are largely gratuitous statements not supported by any references 
and not supportable in the testimony because that has not been 
transcribed. 
The Notice of Appeal was captioned in Case No. 186725 
(R. 261) and respondent, therefore, submits that the issue on 
appeal is limited to the ruling of Judge Croft that the decision 
in No. 186725 was not !!!. judicata of the action under 78-45-3 ~d 
4 (R. 259 and see R. 57 in# C78-6783). 
Appellant sought an interlocutory appeal from that 
ruling. Appellant's petition is not in the record, but the 
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objections of respondent to that petition have been included 
(R. 43-46). This matter was given Case No. 16303 in the Supreme 
Court. 
The Notice of Appeal having been given in civil action 
No. 18672S (R. 261 in that record), the Affidavit of the respondent 
appearing in No. 18672S at R. 263-264 must be ignored, since the 
District Court no longer had jurisdiction of that action. That 
is the sense of the respondent's Motion to Dismiss that petition 
dated September 7, 1979, which also appears in the transcript 
of No. 18672S (R. 266). 
The District Court awarded attorney's fees in this 
matter (R. SS) and respondent requests that additional attorney's 
fees be allowed for the handling of this appeal, in the event 
the Judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 
POINTS RELIED ON 
Point I. The trial court was right in denying appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss based on the doctrine of !!! judicata. 
Point II. Appellant's point that the order of the Court 
is inequitable cannot be considered in the absence of the transcript 
of testimony. 
Point III. This Court should allow additional attorney's 
fees to the respondent. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED 
ON THE DOCTRINE OF ~ JUDICATA 
In divorce actions in Utah, the Court has continuing 
jurisdiction as to matters of support for children. Section 
30-3-5 (1), u.c.A. (1953, As Amended). 
Josephine Garrand brought an Order to Show Cause on 
for hearing before the District Court on April 12, 1977 (R. 191 
in 186725). The minute entry of the Court states: 
"The Court holds that the defendant is entitled 
to receive support for the boy until he reaches 
t,he age of 21 and orders the plaintiff to continue 
until that time. The child support on the boy 
will be increased to $240 per month ($190 for 
April) until he reaches 21 years of age, at which 
time it will terminate. 11 
Finding of Fact No. 3 recited that Joseph would become 
21 years of age on November 15, 1977 (R. 193), and Conclusion of 
Law No. 4 states: 
"4. Under the original Decree in this action, the 
obligation for support continued as to the son 
Joseph until he reached age twenty-one, which 
matter continues to be justiciable under the 
amendment to Section 15-2-1, u.c.A. 1953, by 
this Court and because of special circumstances 
as to Joseph, the support should continue to 
age twenty-one. 11 (R. 196) 
And the Decree makes the support for Joseph continue: 
" ••• through November, 1977 shall be payable 
on the first of each month." 
The statute which Judge Banks was applying was enacted in 1975 
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and provides: 
"15-2-1. The period of minority extends in 
males and females to the aqe of 18 years1 
but all minors obtain their majority by 
marriaqe. It is further provided that courts 
in divorce actions may order support to aqe 21." 
u.c.A. (1953, As Amended). 
Dehm v. Dehm (Januarr 14, 1976), 545 P.2d 525, consi-
dered Section 30-3-5 and holds that the court has continuinq 
jurisdiction on support matters and also considered Section 
78-45-3 and 4 as well as 78-45-2(4), which defines a child as a 
son or dauqhter under the aqe of 21 years: 
"· •• or a son or dauqhter of whatever aqe who 
is incapacitated from earninq a livinq and with-
out sufficient means." 
Section 15-2-1 was not before the court in .!!!!!!!!• as that action 
arose before the amendment to the statute. .!!!!!!!! holds that support 
for an incapacitated child over 21 can be obtained in a divorce 
action or in an action under Chapter 45 of Title 78 (P. 528). 
Judqe Banks placed his decision under Section 15-2-1, which pre• 
scribed the jurisdiction of the divorce court to continuing support 
until the period of minority is past. 
It is, therefore, plain that Chapter 45 of Title 78 was 
not before Judqe Banks1 there was no issue as to support beyond 
aqe 211 and Judqe Banks made no findinq or conclusion or provisiQD 
in the Decree to preclude application for support for 
tated child. 
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When Joseph turned 21, there were two alternatives to 
get support: Plaintiff could have re-opened the divorce action 
under Dehm, supra, or could have proceeded under Chapter 45 of 
Title 78 as, in fact, she did. The decision in Dehm was a 
three to two decision, and the reasoning suggests plainly that 
the better approach to the problem is to treat childhood as 
terminating at age 21 and to proceed on a different theory and 
a different cause of action thereafter. 
With this background, appellant raises the question of 
whether ~ judicata applies to this proceeding. He correctly 
refers to Searle Brothers v. Searle as a late pronouncement on 
' 
this subject. It is reported at 588 P .2d 689. Searle establishes' 
three tests to determine whether ~ judicata applies. They are: 
(1) The same parties or their privies: (2) the same cause of 
action: (3) attempt to relitigate all issues that could have been 
litigated or were in fact litigated (P. 690). Dehm, supra, 
establishes that there are two causes of action, one under the 
divorce statute and one under the Civil Liability for Support 
Act, 78-45-3 and 4, u.c.A. (1953, As Amended). Judge Banks 
limited himself to the cause of action under the divorce pro-
ceeding and Section 15-2-1 and the liability after age 21 was 
not before the Court. ~ judicata does not apply. 
Appellant urges collateral estoppel if ~ judicata 
does not apply. Searle at page 691 establishes four tests for 
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application of collateral estoppel: 
"l. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudi-
cation identical with the one presented in the 
action in question? 
"2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
"3. Was the party against whom the plea is 
asserted a party or in privity with the party 
to the prior adjudication? * * * 
"Fourth test: 'Was the issue in the first 
case competently, fully and fairly litigated?'n 
Respondent does not contend that Test No. 3 was not 
satisfied, since the plaintiff here is acting for the son as·his 
guardian and appeared by herself but actually in the son's behalf 
in the divorc·e action. But the other tests fail. 
The first test fails because the issue in the divorce 
action was to determine need for support while the child was under 
age 21 with no litigation of the child's need as an adult and 
incapacitated child. The Findings and Conclusions disclose that. 
The second test also failed because there was no final 
judgment on the status of the child and the need for support for 
him under the Civil Liability for Support Act after he· reached 
the age of 21. 
There is failure of the fourth test also because there 
is no evidence that the issue as to the child's status and 
after age 21 was before the Court or was considered by 
or was anything except left 
The factual situation in Searle, supra, 
ferent and of no help. The factual situation in 
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quite similar and holds that two alternative routes were available, 
Respondent submits that if a person becomes an adult at age 18 
but that minority may be extended to 21 for a male child, it is , 
forcing language to treat an adult as a "child". Particularly 
is this true when the majority of courts, according to Dehm, 
terminate the jurisdiction of the divorce court at the majority 
of children, in the absence of a specific statute. The specific 
statute in Utah places incapacitated children under the Civil 
Liability for Support Act, 78-45-2, 3 and 4. 
A significant difference in the causes of action is 
noted in the F~ndings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In the 
proceeding to modify the order in the divorce action and increase ' 
the support money, the Findings of Fact show the increase in needs 
of the child and the ability of the father to pay (R. 193-199 of 
186725). On the other hand, the Findings of Fact in this pro-
ceeding share the expense between the father and the mother and 
make Findings of Fact both as to the ability of the plaintiff to 
pay and the ability of the defendant to pay, apparently dividing 
the expense equally between the parties. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S POINT THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT 
IS INEQUITABLE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE 
ABSENCE OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 52-53 
of C78-6783) support the Decree, requiring the defendant to 
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pay approximately half of the support for Joseph commencing with 
June, 1979, and in the absence of the transcript of testimony, 
there is no basis for attacking these Findings of Fact and 
the order consequent thereon. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD ALLOW ADDITIONAL 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE RESPONDENT 
The trial court awarded $300 to the plaintiff for the 
use of her attorney (R. 53 and 55). 
The defendant brought the matter to this Court on a 
petition for interlocutory appeal, in which plaintiff's attorney 
filed a responsive pleading and memorandum (R. 43-46 of C78-6783). 
This Court has discretion to award attorney's fees on 
appeal. ~ v. Bates (Utah 1977), 560 P.2d 7061 2!.!!!!. v. ~ 
Lake Real Estate (1955), 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Court has continuing jurisdiction in child 
support matters, and presumably has similar continuing juris-
diction in civil liability for support cases, the doctrine of 
~ judicata does not have application to this type of case. 
And if the tests for application of the doctrine of 
res judicata and of collateral estoppel were applied to this 
case, the application would fail because this is a different 
cause of action, because the issue here litigated was not decided 
previously, Joseph now being a.~ adult, and the issue of fixing 
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the burden of what appears to be permanent support between father 
and mother was not litigated previously. Plaintiff was confronud 
with a choice of proceeding under the divorce action or under the 
statute for civil liability support of a handicapped child and 
made what appeared then and now to be the more reasonable choice, 
'l'he Court should award additional attorney's fees to be fixed on 
remand to the District Court. 
DATED this I :,-,J day of November, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. ·, , , 
333 East Fourth south -
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Received copies of the within Brief this ~~- day of 
November, 1979. 
Attorney for Appellant 
431 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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